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This is my first contribution to a festschrift. Although new to this branch of literature, I have 
gleaned there are loose rules applicable to essays written in honour of someone.1 Essays 
should somehow relate to the person celebrated. In turn, the focus, and indeed the topic, of an 
essay should generally veer away from an autobiographical discourse of the person doing the 
celebrating. In writing this note, I have found my first rule is relatively easy to follow. My 
second rule is trickier to adhere to. The simple fact of this contribution to his festschrift 
shows I might have insights or anecdotes that explain a bit more about the exceptional 
scholarship, and more importantly the fine man, represented by the honouree.  
Fortunately, I have been able to look to the work of Professor Carey Miller to confirm I 
should not worry about eschewing autobiography entirely, as he demonstrated in a 
contribution to a recent festschrift.2 As such, before explaining the topic of this essay and its 
relevance to the honouree, I will take a moment to set out some of the occasions where David 
and I worked together. 
Despite our shared connections to Aberdeen, I first met David at the University of 
Strathclyde, when it played host to the 2005 Society of Legal Scholars conference, just after I 
finished my law degree there. On the basis that I was about to move to the University of 
Aberdeen to study the Diploma in Legal Practice (as the professional training phase of legal 
education in Scotland was then known), I was able to speak to David and strike up the 
beginnings of a relationship that resulted in me being both a research student and a tutor for 
the School of Law whilst working towards my qualification. Some of my research work was 
                                                          
1 Advice is available. See David Schleicher, ‘From Here All-the-Way-down, or How to Write a Festschrift 
Piece’, Tulsa Law Review, 48 (2012–2013), 401–25. 
2 David L. Carey Miller, ‘Lawyer for all Time’ in Andrew Burrows, David Johnston and Reinhard 
Zimmermann, Judge and Jurist: Essays in honour of the late Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (Oxford, 2013), 383–
97. 
independent,3 but the most significant works were produced in partnership with David. This 
collaboration came to fruition in the form of two pieces of work: one on the boundaries of 
property law;4 and another on one of David’s specialist subjects, corporeal moveable 
property.5 
After completing my diploma, I retained some links to the School of Law, delivering 
a seminar to LLB students and participating in the Baltimore/Maryland Summer School, both 
at the David’s invitation.6 I then re-joined the School of Law as a lecturer in 2011, working 
with David on a range of matters: teaching for the undergraduate property law course; 
submitting a response to the Scottish Law Commission on the reform of security for 
corporeal moveables;7 and presenting to a delegation of Norwegian judges about aspects of 
Scottish land law. With the latter, David presented on the access provisions contained in the 
Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 (asp 2). He returned to this topic at a conference in his 
native South Africa, resulting in a paper for the Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal.8  
I am aware my work with David only represents the tip of the iceberg as regards his 
scholarship, but that tip reveals something that is worthy of further study. Much has been 
written about Scotland’s new access regime, including David’s valuable contribution, but a 
dedicated, modern Scottish analysis of the extent of an owner’s entitlement to exclude others 
from property remains lacking. This essay will explore that, and specifically consider the 
shift away from a strong mandate to regulate access to private property, set against the body 
of literature about the so-called right to exclude. As we shall see, it is difficult for any legal 
system to completely align with the paradigm of a full exclusionary entitlement. However, it 
is not redundant to analyse how Scots law measures against that paradigm. This exercise 
                                                          
3 One output from this period was a note about the community right to buy introduced by Part 2 of the Land 
Reform (Scotland) Act 2003: Malcolm M. Combe, ‘No place like Holme: Community Expectations and the 
Right to Buy’, Edinburgh Law Review, 11(1) (2007) 109–16. It was based on a paper I presented to a conference 
in 2006, in a session chaired by Professor Carey Miller. I was able to register my thanks to him for his (and 
Professor Roderick R. M. Paisley’s) support in a printed acknowledgement. 
4 David L. Carey Miller and Malcolm M. Combe, ‘The Boundaries of Property Rights in Scots Law’, European 
Journal of Comparative Law, 10(3) (2006), http://www.ejcl.org/103/art103-4.pdf, accessed 4 December 2016. 
5 David L. Carey Miller, Malcolm M. Combe, Andrew J. M. Steven and Scott Wortley, ‘National Report on the 
Transfer of Movables in Scotland’ in Wolfgang Faber and Brigitta Lurger (eds), National Reports on the 
Transfer of Movables in Europe Volume 2: England and Wales, Ireland, Scotland, Cyprus, (Munich, 2009), 
297–470. 
6 David’s contribution to the success of this Summer School cannot be understated, not least for his ability to 
attract one slightly more prestigious speaker than me on an annual basis, namely the late Lord Rodger: Carey 
Miller, ‘Lawyer for all Time’, 384. 
7 Scottish Law Commission, Discussion Paper on Moveable Transactions (Scot Law Com DP No 151, 2011). 
See Andrew J. M. Steven, ‘Reform of Security over Moveables: Still a Longstanding Reform Agenda in Scots 
Law’, in this volume. 
8 David L. Carey Miller, ‘Public Access to Private Land in Scotland’, Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal, 
15(2) (2012), 119–47 http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/pelj.v15i2.6, accessed 4 December 2016. 
gives a prime example of how much erosion there can be to a system associated with a strong 
exclusionary right whilst a recognisable system of property law remains.  
 
The right to exclude – in theory and in literature 
What is meant by the right to exclude? It is one of the rights in the ‘bundle of rights’ found in 
property law. 
Instantly, there is a conceptual problem for a Scots lawyer. I do not recall paying 
much attention to bundles of rights in the undergraduate property law course I studied. No 
criticism of my alma mater is intended: I do not espouse the bundle of rights theory to 
undergraduates now that I lecture in Scots private law. Perhaps it does not hold a special 
value to Scots law scholars.9 (The ‘befogging metaphor’10 does not always hold a special 
value to non-Scots either.) That is not to say I am unaware of the theory, and its use to 
separate out institutions of property law with physical property itself: ‘the right to convey, the 
right to devise, the right to use, and, top of the pile, the right to exclude.’11 
That quote comes from an article by Professor Anderson on the educational benefits 
of using the right to exclude in teaching – perhaps I have missed a trick in my teaching 
practice to date – before noting an immersion in ‘Blackstonian absolutism’12 can lead 
students to struggle to appreciate how rights might be relational and may vary depending on 
who is on the other side of a particular dialectic. Anderson subsequently explains how the 
strong right to exclude that pervades the jurisprudence of the United States of America13 can 
be best set in context – and challenged – by comparative law analysis, before considering the 
                                                          
9 In a leading student textbook on Scots property law, Gretton and Steven do not introduce the bundle of rights 
theory, although they do mention the expression ‘dismemberments of ownership’ in the context of encumbering 
ownership: George L. Gretton and Andrew J. M. Steven, Property, Trusts and Succession (3rd edn, Haywards 
Heath, 2017), para. 2.5. Instead, the preference for analysis in terms of the civil law constituent rights of use 
(usus), fruits (fructus) and consumption or disposal (abusus) prevails. See also Hector L. MacQueen and Rt. 
Hon. Lord Eassie (eds), Gloag and Henderson: The Law of Scotland (14th edn, Edinburgh, 2017) para. 30.01. 
10 Thomas W. Merrill, ‘Property and the Right to Exclude’, Nebraska Law Review, 77(4) (1998), 730–55, 755. 
11 Jerry L. Anderson, ‘Comparative Perspectives on Property Rights: The Right to Exclude’, Journal of Legal 
Education, 56(4) (2006), 539–50. 
12 Ibid., 539, before quoting Blackstone’s characterisation of ownership as the ‘sole and despotic dominion’ over 
a thing, to the ‘total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.’ William Blackstone, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book the Second (Albany, N.Y., 1899), 2. 
13 Except, Anderson muses, in South Dakota: ibid., 545. Cf the discussion in Eric T. Freyfogle, ‘Property law in 
a time of transformation: the record of the United States’, 131(4) (2014), South African Law Journal, 883–921 
and Eric T. Freyfogle, On Private Property: Finding Common Ground on the Ownership of Land (Boston, 
2007), chapter 2, entitled ‘The Lost Right to Roam’. 
situations in Laos, Norway, Sweden and ‘Britain’ (although, slightly disappointingly, the 
analysis of Britain Anderson describes is restricted to England and Wales).14 
Before proceeding any further, it seems prudent to do some fundamental groundwork. 
Where does that ‘bundle of rights’ – perhaps a ‘tartan weave of rights’ would be a more 
appropriate Scottish analogy – originate?15 The starting point is ownership, or dominium: the 
main real right;16 the ‘greatest possible interest in a thing which a mature system of law 
recognizes’.17  
It can take quite a logical step to get to the idea of ownership as a legal concept in the 
first place, but for the moment the starting point of dominium will be taken as a given.18 What 
does ownership entail? Scotland does not have a neat civil code that says what ownership 
is,19 but that is unlikely to cause its property lawyers to panic. The triplet of usus, fructus and 
abusus is well known. Autonomy abounds for the owner, who has the right to use the 
property subject to ‘law or paction’, as Erskine would put it, before noting that ownership 
‘necessarily excludes every other person but the proprietor’.20 
Is it worthwhile to try to demarcate what that autonomy entails? In his influential 
essay, Honoré begins with a detailed disclaimer which concludes that it is not ‘worthless to 
try to delineate the incidents [of ownership] in the ordinary, uncomplicated case’.21 He then 
lists eleven incidents.22 How that mix coalesces to form ownership might vary from situation 
to situation. It is clear from Honoré’s analysis that not all the listed incidents are individually 
                                                          
14 Anderson repeats this approach in a slightly later article: Anderson, ‘Britain's Right to Roam: Redefining the 
Landowner's Bundle of Sticks’, Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, 19(3) (2006–2007), 
375–435. That article gives a slightly unconvincing explanation. He states studies of Scotland (and Northern 
Ireland) are ‘not relevant to my purpose and would unnecessarily complicate the article’, when in fact a study of 
Scotland’s liberal access laws could have fortified the thrust of his article. 
15 On the origin more generally, see Jane Ball, ‘The Boundaries of Property Rights in English Law’, European 
Journal of Comparative Law, 10.3 (2006) http://www.ejcl.org/103/art103-1.pdf, accessed 4 December 2016, 4–
5. 
16 See Kenneth G. C. Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland (Edinburgh, 1996) paras 4 and 5, drawing on Stair, 
Institutions, II.1.28. 
17 A. M. Honoré, ‘Ownership’ in A. G. Guest, Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford, 1961), 106–47. 
18 Consider Jonathan B. Wiener, ‘What Begat Property’, History of Political Economy, 43:2 (2011) 353–60. 
19 Although there have been occasional moves towards codification of aspects of it: David L. Carey Miller, 
‘Scottish Property: a system of Civilian principle. But could it be codified?’, in Hector L. MacQueen, Antoni 
Vaquer and Santiago Espiau Espiau (eds), Regional Private Laws and Codification in Europe (Cambridge, 
2003), 118–135. 
20 Erskine, An Institute of the Law of Scotland, first edition (Edinburgh, 1773; reprinted as Old Studies in Scots 
Law, vol. 5, Edinburgh, 2014), II.1.1. See also Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland, para. 5. 
21 Compare the comments of Gordon, which are analysed further in the discussion about corporeal moveables 
below: William M. Gordon, in Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland, para. 533. 
22 Honoré, ‘Ownership’ 113–128. These are: the right to possess; the right to use; the right to manage; the right 
to income; the right to capital; the right to security; the incident of transmissibility; the incident of absence of 
term; the prohibition of harmful use; liability to execution; and the incident of residuarity. 
necessary for someone to be designated owner.23 Most importantly for this analysis, he 
rejects the idea of one criterion being the difference between ownership and lesser interests.24 
That said, Honoré observes that the right to possess – that is to say, to have exclusive 
physical control of a thing, or to have such control as the nature of the thing admits – is ‘the 
foundation on which the whole superstructure of ownership rests.’25 ‘From an English law 
perspective’, Cooke asks, ‘is there a core to the ownership bundle, one essential 
ingredient?’26 She observes ‘[o]ne suggestion is inalienability’, before continuing ‘[a] more 
truly core concept is the power to exclude others.’27 Returning to Honoré’s analysis, in the 
context of land he notes ‘a general licence…to enter on the “property” of others would put an 
end to the institution of landowning as we now know it.’28 
Anderson’s comments above make clear there are other rights that co-exist, but it is 
also clear that he places much import on the right to exclude (as a teaching aid and more 
generally). Further theoretical contributions have been made by American scholars, perhaps 
most famously by Merrill,29 with other analysis from Alexander and Peñalver,30 Sawers31 and 
(with a convenient, for present purposes, Scottish slant) Lovett,32 amongst others.33 Merrill’s 
[in]famous article has been something of a poster boy of a movement that the right to exclude 
is the sine qua non of ownership,34 to the extent that he was moved to refine some of his 
                                                          
23 Ibid., 112–3 
24 Ibid., 125–6. 
25 Ibid., 113. 
26 Elizabeth Cooke, Land Law (Oxford, 2012), 3. 
27 Ibid., 3–4. Cooke further continues, ‘My piano is mine, and therefore I am entitled to stop you playing it; my 
land is mine, and so I can keep you out.’ Understandably, she then follows those examples with a counter-
example, of a police officer exercising power legitimately. 
28 Ibid., 114. The full quote is instructive: ‘It is of the essence of the right to possess that it is in rem in the sense 
of availing against persons generally. This does not, of course, mean that an owner is necessarily entitled to 
exclude everyone from his property. We happily speak of ownership of land, yet a largish number of officials 
have the right of entering on private land without the owner’s consent, for some limited period and purpose. On 
the other hand, a general licence so to enter on the “property” of others would put an end to the institution of 
landowning as we now know it.’ As shall be discussed later, there are now a number of contexts where a largish 
number of non-officials are allowed on private land in Scotland without the owner’s consent. 
29 Merrill, ‘Property and the Right to Exclude’. 
30 Gregory S. Alexander and Eduardo M. Peñalver, An Introduction to Property Theory, (Cambridge, 2012), 
149–55. Consider also Gregory S. Alexander, ‘The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law’, 
Cornell Law Review, 94(4) (2009), 745–819, 801–10. 
31 Brian Sawers, ‘The Right to Exclude from Unimproved Land’, Temple Law Review, 83(3) (2010–2011) 665–
96. 
32 John A. Lovett, ‘Progressive property in action: the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003’, Nebraska Law 
Review, 89(4) (2011), 739–818, particularly 743–50. 
33 David L. Callies and J. David Breemer, ‘The Right to Exclude Others From Private Property: A Fundamental 
Constitutional Right’, Washington University Journal of Law and Policy, 3 (2000), 39–59. (That particular issue 
of the journal was entitled ‘Evolving Voices in Land Use Law: A Festschrift in Honour of Daniel R 
Mandelker’). 
34 Cf Henry E. Smith, ‘The Thing About Exclusion’, Property Rights Conference Journal 3 (2014) 95–123. This 
article opens with the subtle variation that, ‘The right to exclude is a sine qua non of debates over property’, 
observations in a subsequent paper,35 but even there it is clear that the right to exclude has a 
certain primacy. 
There is a wider debate as to whether exclusion is the single variable essential that 
makes ownership what it is or whether it is part of a multiple variable mix,36 and there are 
alternative viewpoints to the primacy of the right to exclude.37 Honoré’s exhortation that you 
should not prioritise one over any other has already been noted. There has been scholarship 
about the priority of the incident of use38 or the importance of the owner’s role as agenda 
setter.39 Some argue any property rights should be linked to notions of ‘human flourishing’40 
and the ‘social obligation norm’.41  
All of this could be explored in more detail, but even with those alternative 
perspectives on ownership it is clear exclusion theory has a special place in property theory, 
in terms of legal scholarship42 and beyond.43 Whilst aspects of exclusion theory can also be 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
before concluding, ‘The right to exclude is an important feature of property, albeit not a sine qua non’ 122. 
Instead of the right to exclude, Smith homes in on the thing that there might be a right to exclude from as the 
heart of property law.  
35 Thomas W. Merrill, ‘Property and the Right to Exclude II’, Property Rights Conference Journal, 3 (2014), 1–
25. 
36 Merrill, ‘Property and the Right to Exclude’, 734 
37 The important contribution of A. J. van der Walt in ‘The Modest Systemic Status of Property Rights’, Journal 
of Law, Property, and Society, 1 (2014), 15–106 is acknowledged, but not analysed at this stage. His work will 
be returned to below. 
38 See the discussions in Merrill, ‘Property and the Right to Exclude II’, 4–5, Susan Pascoe, ‘Social obligation 
norm and the erosion of land ownership?’ The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 76(6) (2012) 484–97, 485–7 
and Lovett, ‘Progressive property in action’, 743–53. Consider also Rahmatian, who notes in his analysis of the 
treatment of property by Lord Kames that ‘there is an external and an internal aspect which can be regarded as 
two sides of the same coin: the rights to exclude or the external aspect, and the rights to use or the internal 
aspect of property rights.’ Andreas Rahmatian, Lord Kames: Legal and Social Theorist (Edinburgh, 2015), 227. 
Here he refers to J. E. Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (Oxford, 1997). In turn, at the beginning of his 
chapter 4 (entitled ‘The Right to Property, the Exclusion Thesis’), Penner notes exclusion and use are 
‘intertwined’. See also Jonnette Watson Hamilton and Nigel Bankes, ‘Different views of the cathedral: the 
literature on property law theory Property and the Law in Energy and Natural Resources’ in Aileen McHarg, 
Barry Barton, Adrian Bradbrook and Lee Godden, Property and the Law in Energy and Natural Resources 
(Oxford 2010), 19–59, 27. 
39 Larissa Katz, ‘Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law’, University of Toronto Law Journal, 58(3) (2008), 
275–315. 
40 Consider Eric T. Freyfogle, ‘Private Ownership and Human Flourishing: An Exploratory Overview’, 
Stellenbosch Law Review, 24(3) (2013), 430–54, drawing: on Hanri Mostert and Thomas W Bennett (eds), 
Pluralism and Development (Cape Town, 2012); and A. J. van der Walt, Property in the Margins (2009, 
Oxford). In relation to the exclusionary focus of this chapter, see Alexander and Peñalver, An Introduction to 
Property Theory, 149–55. 
41 Alexander, ‘The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law’. See also Pascoe, ‘Social obligation 
norm and the erosion of land ownership?’. 
42 A. J. van der Walt, ‘The Modest Systemic Status of Property Rights’, especially 17–23, and see now Jonathan 
Klick and Gideon Parchomovsky, ‘The Value of the Right to Exclude: An Empirical Assessment’, University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, 165(4) (2016–2017), 917–66, 923–35. Cf Freyfogle, On Private Property, xvi. 
43 For example, Garret Hardin’s critique of a common approach to resources is well known: ‘The Tragedy of the 
Commons’, Science 162 (1968) 1243–8, but cf Avital Margalit, ‘Commons and Legality’ in Gregory S. 
Alexander and Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property and Community (Oxford, 2010) 141–63. Meanwhile, Harold 
Demsetz highlights the economic case for exclusion in ‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights’, The American 
found in diverse areas such as criminal law,44 invasion of privacy,45 international law and 
state sovereignty,46 and intellectual property (if that is to be classed as separate to property 
law as a whole),47 the right to exclude has acquired a particular property law resonance in 
many legal systems. It threads into emerging comparative48 and international treatments of 
property law,49 not to mention human rights insofar as they relate to property.50 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Economic Review, 57(2) (1967), 347–59, for example at 356 by noting (in the context of a comparison between 
communal and individual ownership) ‘an owner, by virtue of his power to exclude others, can generally count 
on realizing the rewards associated with husbanding the game and increasing the fertility of his land. This 
concentration of benefits and costs on owners creates incentives to utilize resources more efficiently.’ See also 
Gregory S. Alexander, The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (Chicago and London, 2006) 5 and particularly footnote 20 there, and Laura S. Underkuffler-
Freund, ‘Property, a Special Right’ Notre Dame Law Review, 71(5) (1996), 1033–58, 1038. 
44 And relatedly, the integrity of the human body regarding consent to medical treatment. Consider Montgomery 
v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, about the importance of a patient’s autonomy when it comes to 
making informed consent about a medical option. 
45 Hector L. MacQueen, ‘A Hitchhikers Guide to Personality Rights in Scots Law, Mainly with Regard to 
Privacy’ in Niall R. Whitty and Reinhard Zimmermann, Rights of Personality in Scots Law: A Comparative 
Perspective (Dundee, 2009), 549–88. See also Jace C. Gatewood, ‘The Evolution of the Right to Exclude – 
More than a Property Right, a Privacy Right’, Mississippi College Law Review, 32(3) (2014), 447–65. 
46 This strong, non-interventionist view of sovereignty can be seen in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. It is 
strongly associated with Hersch Lauterpacht, and indeed an analogy he makes between property law and 
international law is discussed in John G. Sprankling, ‘The Global Right to Property’, Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law, 52(2) (2013-2014), 464–505, 467. Consider also Aaron Schwabach, ‘Diverting the Danube: 
The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dispute and International Freshwater Law’, Berkeley Journal of International Law, 
14(2) (1996), 290–343, 325–36. One recent example of a typical property law encroachment actually involving 
an international element (as the encroachment crossed the Czech-Austrian border) can be found on the Radio 
Praha website, 22 June 2006 ‘Exasperated hotel owner saws off own roof to resolve border dispute’ 
http://www.radio.cz/en/section/curraffrs/exasperated-hotel-owner-saws-off-own-roof-to-resolve-border-dispute, 
accessed 4 December 2016. 
47 Perhaps the prime example of an exclusionary right is the patent, governed in the UK by the Patents Act 1977, 
but exclusionary ideas are also evident in other IP areas like copyright and trade marks. The social obligation 
theory aspects of intellectual property are touched on in relation to copyright and patent in Alexander, ‘The 
Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law’, 810–5. See more generally Charlotte Waelde, Abbe 
Brown, Smita Kheria and Jane Cornwell, Contemporary Intellectual Property: Law and Policy, fourth edition 
(Oxford, 2016), 1.33–1.35. See also Gillian Black, ‘Exclusive Privilege: Adam Smith, John Millar, and the 
Creation of a New Right?’ in Ross G. Anderson, James Chalmers and John MacLeod (eds), Glasgow 
Tercentenary Essays: 300 Years of the School of Law (Edinburgh, 2014), 20–52. 
48 See the Draft Common Frame of Reference, which defines ownership as the most comprehensive right a 
person, the owner, can have over property, including the exclusive right, so far as consistent with applicable 
laws or rights granted by the owner, to use, enjoy, modify, destroy, dispose of and recover the property: 
Christian von Bar, Eric Clive, Hans Schulte-Nölke et al (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of 
European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (Munich, 2009) VIII-1:202. 
49 John G. Sprankling, ‘The Emergence of International Property Law’, North Carolina Law Review, 90(2) 
(2012), 461–509; Sprankling, The International Law of Property, chapter 13 (entitled ‘The Right to Exclude’), 
touching on diverse matters like the “generally unfettered” right to eject (citing Appleby v United Kingdom 37 
EHRR 38 para 22) and also looking at Chinese, Vietnamese, American, Japanese and Shari’a rules about 
interfering or encroaching on another’s property (at 311); and Sprankling, ‘The Global Right to Property’. 
50 Theo R. G. van Banning, The Human Right to Property (Antwerpen, 2002), 1.2.2 and 2.2.2 (particularly 
pages 90–2). This coverage touches on Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the entitlement to peaceful enjoyment of possessions, but the clearest characterisation of the right to 
exclude analysed there relates to the home, in terms of Article 8 (considered in Niemietz v. Germany, judgment 
of 16 December 1992, Series A no.251-B). See also the discussion at 2.2.4. Perhaps not too much should be 
made of this for the present analysis, because rights to a home and property rights should not be conflated: as 
Carey Miller reminds us, ‘Property and housing are associated matters but, of course, involve entirely distinct 
rights.’ David L. Carey Miller, ‘The Great Trek to Human Rights: The Role of Comparative Law in the 
Of course, we do not live in a world where the owner of a thing can completely 
exclude all others from that thing in all circumstances.51 It is difficult to imagine a legal 
system where a hermit could cocoon himself and all of his patrimony from all other people. 
To give an example, state authorities can enter premises for law enforcement purposes with 
appropriate authorisation.52 Meanwhile, someone benevolently intervening to avert a 
dangerous situation or of necessity escaping a peril in a manner that involves a temporary 
incursion onto another’s property would not normally be expected to obtain prior consent.53 
With that backdrop, not to mention Honoré’s observation that no aspect of ownership trumps 
the others, can any legal system, never mind Scotland, be expected to ever fully meet the 
paradigm most associated with Merrill: “Deny someone the exclusion right and they do not 
have property?”54 If not, what is the point of comparing any system to that paradigm? 
It is submitted that it is not a hollow exercise to do so. In fact, Scotland showcases 
how much erosion there can be to a system associated with a strong exclusionary right whilst 
retaining a recognisable system of property law.  
Whilst this study will bring its own insight, I appreciate I am following in the 
footsteps of a giant. This is because Scots law is not the only legal system embarking on a 
journey of reform or reconceptualisation. Professor Carey Miller considered the South 
African system’s remarkable journey alongside Scotland’s in the article referred to in my 
introduction. As he explains:55 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Development of Human Rights in Post-Reform South Africa’ in E. Örücü (ed.), Judicial Comparativism in 
Human Rights Cases (Birmingham, 2003), 201–27, 214. Of more relevance to this exclusion analysis is Article 
17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which recognises the right to own property and that there 
should not be arbitrary deprivations. Cf Laura Dehaibi, ‘The Case for an Inclusive Human Right to Property: 
Social Importance and Individual Self-Realization’, Western Journal of Legal Studies 6(1) (2015) 5, at 
http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/uwojls/vol6/iss1/5, accessed 4 December 2016. 
51 Alexander and Peñalver, An Introduction to Property Theory, chapter 7 (entitled ‘The Right to Exclude and 
Its Limits’). 
52 See Sprankling, The International Law of Property, where he considers that the home is safeguarded from 
arbitrary interference (with reference to the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, Article 17, the 
European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8, and American Convention on Human Rights, Article 11 
(313)). Scottish situations of necessity and state authorisation are discussed at MacQueen and Eassie, Gloag and 
Henderson, (eds) 34.15, with the examples of extinguishing a fire, pursuit of a criminal, a constable ascertaining 
whether a crime is being committed, and statutory conferrals of a right to enter such as under the Health and 
Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, section 20. To this can be added rights of entry to land under the High Hedges 
(Scotland) Act 2013 (asp 6) to deal with offending foliage and Antisocial Behaviour etc. (Scotland) Act 2004 
(asp 8), s 47 (powers of entry and seizure of equipment used to make noise unlawfully). 
53 George Joseph Bell, Principles of the Law of Scotland, fourth edition (Edinburgh, 1839; reprinted as Old 
Studies in Scots Law, vol. 1, Edinburgh, 2010), § 956–958. Consider also Kames, Principles of Equity § 134. 
Consider also Sprankling, The International Law of Property, 320–2. 
54 Merrill, ‘Property and the Right to Exclude’, 730. 
55 Carey Miller, ‘Public Access to Private Land in Scotland’, 143. 
The South African Constitution sets out a controlling agenda for land reform with major 
implications for the protection of property in terms of the position of the common law. 
As part of that development the landowner's power to evict has been redefined but 
without recognition of any general notion of public access to private property. However, 
as Professor André van der Walt has shown, post-apartheid case law does reflect certain 
moves to restrict a landowner's general right to exclude.56 But a limit on the power to 
exclude persons, on the basis of their behaviour, from private premises open to the 
public57 is different in kind from a general right of public access for recreational and 
educational purposes. 
 
This extract provides at least two topics for analysis, namely public access to private 
land and eviction. Those will be considered here, alongside certain other exclusionary aspects 
of Scots law. To keep the scope of that analysis in check, again Professor Carey Miller 
provides some guidance. He restricted one of his studies to matters of corporeal property as 
‘the most important part of any system of property law’.58 Similarly, this paper will focus on 
Scotland’s treatment of such tangible things against the exclusion paradigm.59 Land will be 
an important part of the coverage, but it would be remiss not to cover corporeal moveables, 
especially when one considers Carey Miller’s huge contribution in that area of scholarship.60 
Another restriction which will keep this analysis in check is a focus on situations where there 
is no particular relationship between a landowner and the person they are seeking to exclude. 
There will be no consideration of, for example, matrimonial homes legislation61 and 
                                                          
56 Here, Carey Miller cites van der Walt, Property in the Margins, 195. 
57 Here, Carey Miller cites Victoria & Albert Waterfront (Pty) Ltd v Police Commissioner, Western Cape 2004 4 
SA 444 (C). 
58 Carey Miller, ‘Scottish Property: a system of Civilian principle. But could it be codified?’, 118. Admittedly, 
his statement was about derivative acquisition in the context of voluntary transfer of corporeal goods, so the 
‘most important part’ statement Carey Miller made also included transfer rules within its purview, whereas here 
I am looking only at physical property and not wondering why, how or when someone became the owner of that 
property. That is not to say the rules of original and derivative acquisition are not important, it is simply to 
recognise the limitations of this piece. 
59 Intellectual property is therefore excluded from this particular exclusion analysis, but as already noted that is 
not to say it cannot be subject to exclusion analysis as well. In fact, Merrill considers IP is a prime candidate for 
exclusion analysis: ‘The law with respect to intangible rights in intellectual property is, if anything, even more 
striking in the degree to which the property right and the right to exclude go hand-in-hand. Copyrights, patents, 
trademarks, and trade secrets are all recognized as intangible forms of property. In each case, the core of the 
property right is the right to exclude others from interfering with or using the right in specified ways’. Merrill, 
Property and the Right to Exclude, 749. 
60 D. L. Carey Miller with David Irvine, Corporeal Moveables in Scots Law (2nd edn, Edinburgh, 2005). 
61 Section 1 of the Matrimonial Homes (Family Protection) (Scotland) Act 1981, confers a right of occupancy, 
which can have effect even after an owner deals with the property in terms of s.6. Equivalent rules for (same 
sex) civil-partners are found in the Civil Partnership Act 2004. Occupancy rights can also apply in relation to 
co-habiting couples, allowing a non-owner on application to court to gain occupancy for up to six months: s.18. 
servitudes.62 Analysis of circumstances where an otherwise landlocked proprietor can be 
afforded access to an area of land even where there is no agreement63 and the constitution of 
rights by positive prescription64 will also be eschewed. This approach will highlight relevant 
examples of erosion of the proprietor’s right to exclude, before concluding that those erosions 
of the exclusion paradigm have not damaged the solidity of Scots property law. 
 
Conceptions of the right to exclude – land law 
1. General 
You do not need to look far to find a trend towards exclusivity in Scottish land law.65 
Rankine’s text on Landownership has a chapter headed ‘Exclusive Use, Trespass and 
Game’.66 Erskine’s formulation about exclusivity has already been noted, while Bell notes 
that, ‘The proprietor of land has the exclusive right to the use and occupation, not merely of 
the surface, but of what is below, and what is above the surface, ‘a coelo usque ad 
centrum.’67 These positions, and more, are analysed in detail by Lovett.68 
                                                          
62 In this regard, it can be noted that despite expounding a strong exclusionary approach at the beginning of 
Book II of An Institute of the Law of Scotland, Erskine noted ‘it is most consistent with this rule that the right of 
property may be in one person, while that of servitude, impignoration, or other inferior right in the subject, is 
vested in another. ’Erskine, Institute, II.1.1. The ‘rule’ that is referred to is ‘that two different persons cannot 
have, each of them, full property of the same thing at the same time’. Tangentially, it can be noted that certain 
servitude rights – such as the right to lead a pipe over or under land (Title Conditions (Scotland) Act 2003, s.77. 
Cf the now obsolete Bell, Principles of the Law of Scotland, §  942) or position a septic tank or park a car on 
land (Moncrieff v Jamieson [2007] UKHL 42) are less transient than others. 
63 As was the case in Bowers v Kennedy 2000 S.C. 555. As there is no role for agreement here this exclusion 
from my exclusion analysis is more challenging to justify, but two reasons can be offered. First, Sprankling, The 
International Law of Property, chapter 13 characterises this doctrine as an attenuated example of necessity, a 
doctrine that will be mentioned below. Second, in these situations the access is provided for as a result of 
particular proximate ownership arrangements, so there is a particularity to this exception to the right to exclude 
that would not stop the encumbered landowner from excluding other uninvited parties. 
64 Under the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973. See further George L. Gretton, ‘Reforming the 
Law of Prescriptive Title to Land’, in this volume. In relation to prescription for corporeal moveables, this is a 
matter David Carey Miller and Andrew Simpson analysed in a recent consultation exercise by the Scottish 
Government: see https://consult.scotland.gov.uk/family-and-property-
law/prescription_and_title_to_moveable_property/consultation/view_respondent?uuId=412089906 accessed 4 
December 2016. Further, positive prescription represents a situation where an owner has had a chance to 
exclude another but has not done so, and thereafter loses the right to do so. 
65 On the topic in general, see William M. Gordon and Scott Wortley, Scottish Land Law (3rd edn, vol. 1, 
Edinburgh, 2009), and particularly at 3.02 where it is noted that the owner can ‘resist any unlawful interference 
with the land by temporary or permanent encroachment on the surface of the land, on the air-space above it and 
on the ground beneath the surface.’ 
66 John Rankine, The Law of Land-Ownership in Scotland, fourth edition (Edinburgh, 1909). Also page 134: ‘it 
is the nature of property to be exclusive’. 
67 Bell, Principles of the Law of Scotland, § 940. 
68 Lovett, ‘Progressive Property in Action’, 760–2. 
A landowner can take steps to prevent a crane jib swinging over his property69 and by 
analogy take similar legal steps in relation to a drone flying over his property (but not in 
relation to civil aviation flights).70 As for less temporary exclusions, on an a fortiori analysis 
encroachments by way of building can be prevented or (should it be too late to prevent such 
intrustion) removed.71 The right to remove is however subject to ‘an equitable power of the 
court, in exceptional circumstances, to refuse enforcement of the proprietor’s right’, as set out 
in the case of Anderson v Brattisani’s72, which related to a flue leading from a ground floor 
property up the wall. As explained by Professors Reid and Gretton, in a useful analysis of that 
leading authority and recent case law on similar issues, the flue had been installed with the 
consent of the upper neighbours, but the successor in title to one of those neighbours later 
sought removal of the apparatus from the property he had acquired. The court refused to do 
so, but on such narrow grounds to make clear this compassion would not be conferred 
lightly.73  
That deals with encroachments from the solum up. What about subterranean 
intrusion? Bell wrote that the exclusive right extends downwards and there is ample case law 
in line with that analysis.74 Modern technology and the related regulatory and indeed judicial 
response is challenging that, most notably in relation to extraction of the unconventional 
resource of shale gas.75 Whilst environmental concerns and politics have intervened to the 
                                                          
69 Brown v Lee Constructions Ltd 1977 SLT (Notes) 61. Anyone wishing to lawfully periodically encroach in 
this manner would require an oversail agreement with the proprietor. Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland, 
para. 198. 
70 A landowner’s right to exclude domestic flights from her airspace is restricted by the Civil Aviation Act 1982. 
71 This principle applies equally to a cornice protruding from a building sited on neighbouring land as it does to 
a structure that touches the ground owned by someone else: Milne v Mudie (1828) 6 S. 967; Hazle v Turner 
(1840) 2 D. 886. Cf William Tracey Ltd vSP Transmission PLC [2016] CSOH 14, 2016 SLT 678, discussed in 
Kenneth G. C. Reid and George L. Gretton, Conveyancing 2016 (Edinburgh, 2017), 10–2.  
72 1978 SLT (Notes) 43. 
73 This case, and two modern related cases (with reference to South African scholarship) are discussed in 
Kenneth G. C. Reid and George L. Gretton, Conveyancing 2015 (Edinburgh, 2016), 158–61. They number three 
aspects from the court’s reasoning in Anderson v Brattisani’s (at page 43), namely ‘the court will have to be 
satisfied [1] that the encroachment must in the belief that it was unobjectionable, [2] that it is inconsiderable and 
does not materially impair the proprietor in the enjoyment of his property, and [3] that its removal would cause 
the encroacher a loss wholly disproportionate to the advantage which it would confer upon the proprietor.’ The 
two modern cases are McLellan v J & D Pierce [2015] CSIH 80, 2015 GWD 37-594, where removal was 
ordered after an encroachment where building works continued and were completed despite a request to stop by 
the encroached upon landowner’s solicitor, and Munro v Finlayson 2015 SLT (Sh Ct) 123, a case about a 
driveway where the encroached upon landowner did not seek removal of the drive, but rather sought 
(successfully) an order removing the neighbours, and as such excluding the encroaching neighbour from the use 
of his property. 
74 Erskine, Institute, II, 6, 1; Bell, Principles of the Law of Scotland, § 737–740, 940; Whyte v Lee (1879) 6 R. 
699. This general rule does not prevent separate ownership rights in separate horizontal strata: Gordon and 
Wortley, Scottish Land Law, chapter 5 (entitled ‘Horizontal Subdivision of Land, Minerals and Support). 
75 This encompasses ‘fracking’ in particular, as hydraulic fracturing is commonly known. See generally Tina 
Hunter (ed.), Handbook of Shale Gas Law and Policy: Economics, Access, Law and Regulation in Key 
Jurisdictions (Cambridge, 2016). 
effect that fracking is not proceeding in Scotland for the moment, developments in England 
and Wales are instructive. First, the Infrastructure Act 2015 removes the equivalent chance to 
object to operations below the surface.76 It is open to Scottish legislators to follow. Second, 
the following observations of Lord Hope (a Scottish judge, sitting in an English appeal to the 
UK Supreme Court) suggest the centre of the Earth might not be an appropriate terminus of 
ownership after all.77 He noted: 
 
There must obviously be some stopping point, as one reaches the point at which 
physical features such as pressure and temperature render the concept of the strata 
belonging to anybody so absurd as to be not worth arguing about. But the wells that are 
at issue in this case, extending from about 800 feet to 2,800 feet below the surface, are 
far from being so deep as to reach the point of absurdity. Indeed the fact that the strata 
can be worked upon at those depths points to the opposite conclusion. 
 
Notwithstanding that conceptual challenge from a Scottish judge to a similar English 
rule and the comparator of English legislation that superseded that rule, Scots law still offers 
a strong right to exclude for temporary and not so temporary intrusions below, on and above 
land. The only category (if it is a category) that remains is that of a wandering animate object. 
Owners are entitled to remove straying animals from their land (and damage caused by them 
renders the keeper of those animals liable under the Animals (Scotland) Act 1987). Straying 
humans are dealt with below. 
From this brief analysis, it is clear ownership is a powerful starting position. But that 
is also not the full story. As noted in a leading Scots law textbook, ‘the comprehensiveness of 
the right of ownership means that it is open to extensive fragmentation’.78 That is to say, the 
wide range of application is acknowledged as something that lends itself to erosion. Even 
beyond the recognised subordinate real rights (most of which will have been derived from the 
owner or a predecessor in title, and as such are not looked at here), there can also be other 
controls because ‘the law, for policy reasons, from time to time, creates new forms of 
fragmentation by the recognition of rights which have the character of real rights in terms of 
                                                          
76 Section 43 provides ‘A person has the right to use deep-level land in any way for the purposes of exploiting 
petroleum or deep geothermal energy.’ ‘Deep level land’ (per subsection (4)) is any land at a depth of at least 
300 metres below surface level. 
77 Bocardo SA v Star Energy UK Onshore Ltd [2010] UKSC 35, para. 27. See also Jill Morgan, ‘Subsurface 
ownership and hydraulic fracturing in the UK: (probably) under my backyard’, Journal of Business Law, 8 
(2015), 634–48. 
78 MacQueen and Eassie (eds), Gloag and Henderson, 30.01. 
their implications for the relevant core right of ownership.’ Examples are then given relating 
to matrimonial homes and access to land under Part 1 of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 
2003 and (perhaps not so usefully for the present discussion) the rights of community 
acquisition in Parts 2 and 3 of the 2003 Act. Those rights of community acquisition will be 
skimmed over here, as they are about reallocating rather than reconfiguring ownership and 
thus are not directly in point for this discussion.79 As already noted, matrimonial homes will 
not be discussed here. The focus of this paper will now move to the issue of public access to 
private land. 
 
2. Access to private land by those without prior consent 
Perhaps the simplest scenario of the owner’s right to exclude being put to the test is an 
uninvited individual accessing that person’s property. There are essentially three situations 
where Scots property law explicitly allows this: a public right of way; a public right in 
relation to the foreshore or a tidal river;80 or a right of responsible access under the 2003 Act. 
Access to land in Scotland is much discussed and often misunderstood. A commonly 
expressed sentiment is that there is no law of trespass in Scotland. 81 That is not quite right, 
but from the other end of the spectrum a landowner putting up a sign saying 
‘TRESPASSERS WILL BE PROSECUTED’ is likely to be disappointed if it comes to an 
attempt to do so.82 As is often the case, the truth is somewhere between the two, although 
recent reforms have slightly repositioned the truth into friendlier terrain for access advocates. 
Before considering those recent reforms, it is necessary to set out the old ways that 
afforded access. Like many countries, Scotland is covered by an invisible network of 
traditional routes, many of which remain public rights of way. Contemporary rights of way 
may have begun as old routes to take livestock to markets, or they may have been formed in 
living memory after twenty years of unbroken use by members of the public travelling from 
                                                          
79 That said, the wider land reform agenda in Scotland is moving towards recognising community rights of 
acquisition in situations where a landowner might previously have been entitled to do nothing with an asset 
whilst simply excluding others for any reason or none. This will be returned to below. 
80 These are part of the ‘Regalia’, as discussed in Gloag and Henderson, The Law of Scotland, 34.06–34.07, 
citing Hope v Bennewith (1904) 6 F. 1004, Mather v Alexander 1926 S.C. 139 and Burnet v Barclay 1955 J.C. 
34. 
81 The line of argument has most recently been associated with the late Alan Blackshaw: see ‘Implied 
permission and the traditions of customary access’, Edinburgh Law Review, 3(3) (1999), 368 and ‘An historical 
approach to the new outdoor access legislation’, Scottish Affairs, 62 (2008), 1. Cf Jeremy Rowan-Robinson and 
Andrea Ross, ‘The freedom to roam and implied permission’, Edinburgh Law Review, 2(2) (1998), 225. 
82 At one level, a landowner would be disappointed because it is the norm for prosecutions in Scotland to be 
instigated at the behest of a public prosecutor, a step that is not triggered by signage erected by private 
individuals. A landowner may also be disappointed to learn this sign could fall foul of the 2003 Act, s 14 if it is 
positioned in a place where access rights can be enjoyed, as it could be characterised as a baseless attempt to 
dissuade access taking. 
one public place to another.83 Ways are not necessarily sign-posted, nor is it necessary for 
them to appear on maps (in contrast to, for example, England and Wales). Where they exist 
they can and regularly do traverse parcels of land in separate ownership. Affected landowners 
cannot block the route or otherwise interfere with someone taking access along the route.84 
The right to exclude is restricted accordingly. 
Rights of way work well for anyone travelling from point to point. What is the 
situation if someone wants to take a diversion away from a public right of way, or perhaps 
pitch a tent for the night when on a recreational outing? Absent any agreement or quiet 
tolerance by the owner of the land where a diversion or dalliance is planned or taking place, 
the traditional Scots law position is that a landowner can take steps to retain or regain 
exclusive possession. Considering practicalities, a landowner is sometimes restricted in terms 
of remedies against a one-time, bare trespasser. This can be demonstrated by the fact that 
someone taking unauthorised access to land is only liable to a landowner (or indeed 
criminally liable85) for actual damage caused.86 Furthermore, for a prohibition of access 
relative to a specific individual to carry force of law, a court action must be raised against that 
individual. 
Issues of enforcement and a custom of tolerance have undoubtedly contributed to the 
perception that there is no law of trespass in Scotland. However, the balance of scholarly and 
(more importantly) judicial authority tends towards the position that Scotland traditionally 
allows a landowner to exert a significant amount of control over access to his land,87 albeit 
                                                          
83 Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 s.3(3). 
84 See further Douglas J. Cusine and Roderick R. M. Paisley, Servitudes and Rights of Way (Edinburgh, 1998) 
and Roderick R. M. Paisley, Access Rights and Rights of Way (Edinburgh, 2006). 
85 There are some specific statutory offences that might be characterised as having connotations of trespass, such 
as s.56 of the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982 (which relates to the setting of fires in a public place) or 
the Trespass (Scotland) Act 1865 (as amended by the 2003 Act, which makes it an offence to occupy or encamp 
on any private land without prior permission or to encamp or light a fire on or near any road or enclosed or 
cultivated land without consent, unless such activities are properly recreational and within the Land Reform 
(Scotland) Act 2003, which will be discussed below). Reference can also be made to general criminal law and 
targeted legislation relating to public order, such as the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s. 61. That 
allows police holding the reasonable belief that two or more persons are trespassing on land with the common 
purpose of residing there for any period to ask them to leave and take appropriate action if they do not. 
86 Another contrast with England and Wales is apparent. In this situation, Scots law can take solidarity from the 
similar approach in South Africa, as explained by Carey Miller in a passage written in 1986 (drawing on the 
case Hefer v Van Greuning 1979 (4) SA 952 (A)): ‘Roman-Dutch law does not know any specialized action for 
the recovery of damages in respect of the wrongful possession, use or occupation of property. There is nothing 
akin to the tort of trespass of English law and the question is simply whether liability arises on the application of 
the ordinary principles of delict.’ David L. Carey Miller, Acquisition and Protection of Ownership, (Cape Town, 
1986), para. 13.1/page 333. 
87 Consider Lovett, ‘Progressive property in action’, 760 and Lord Trayner’s oft-quoted maxim that it is ‘loose 
and inaccurate’ that there is no law of trespass in Scotland (Wood v North British Railway (1899) 2 F. 1 at 2). 
That case is cited by Paisley, Access Rights and Rights of Way, where he also highlights the compelling 
there are time, money and other practical implications relating to enforcement. Both the 
principle and surrounding practicalities have recently been confirmed by the Court of 
Session.88 That case will be analysed further below:89 for now it will suffice to say that 
political campaigners who had occupied land near the Scottish Parliament were not able to 
fall within the terms of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003. How that legislation works 
will now be considered. 
 
(a) Access to land for passage, recreation, education, and (some) commerce 
Part 1 of the 2003 Act blankets the whole of Scotland, subject to limited exceptions,90 with 
access rights that allow people, perhaps accompanied by an animal or using a non-motorised 
vehicle, to be on or to cross land in a responsible manner. They are rights for everyone. No 
prior bargain or even acquiescence by a landowner or manager is required for ad hoc use, nor 
is prior conduct needed to evidence the rights. This marks something of a challenge to those 
favouring a strong model of exclusion. How do they work without challenging property law 
as a whole? 
The new regime is set out in Part 1 of the 2003 Act,91 as supplemented by the Scottish 
Outdoor Access Code. The Access Code is a freely available document produced by Scottish 
Natural Heritage – and approved by the Scottish Parliament – which gives guidance on how 
access rights and corresponding responsibilities work in practice.92  
In terms of the mechanics of the legislation, only a brief overview is possible here.93 
Section 1 begins by stating ‘Everyone has the statutory rights established by this Part of this 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
inference that, ‘Public rights of way would hardly have been required if there had been no law of trespass’ (at 
40). 
88 Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body v The Sovereign Indigenous Peoples of Scotland [2016] CSOH 65, 
affirmed [2016] CSIH 81. Lord Trayner’s quote in Wood was referred to uncritically by the Outer House (see 
particularly paras 31–33) then approved by the Inner House of the Court of Session. 
89 See also Malcolm M. Combe, ‘The Indycamp: Demonstrating Access to Land and Access to Justice’, 
Edinburgh Law Review, (2017) 21(2), 228–33. 
90 Contained in s.6. The legal framework is set out below. 
91 The remaining Parts of the legislation relate to the community right to buy (Part 2) and the crofting 
community right to buy (Part 3): see Malcolm M. Combe, ‘Parts 2 and 3 of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 
2003: a definitive answer to the Scottish Land Question?’ Juridical Review, 2006 195–227. The Community 
Empowerment (Scotland) Act 2015 has added a new Part 3A and a further community right to buy certain land. 
On that and other recent reforms, see Malcolm M. Combe, ‘The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016: another 
answer to the Scottish Land Question’ Juridical Review, 2016 297–31. 
92 The Access Code is provided for by s.10. See http://www.outdooraccess-scotland.com/, accessed 18 
November 2016. The full Access Code is accessible there. 
93 Access rights have triggered a great deal of analysis. A flavour can be found in: Paisley, Access Rights and 
Rights of Way; Lovett, ‘Progressive property in action’; Carey Miller, ‘Public Access to Private Land in 
Scotland’; Combe, ‘Get off that land: non-owner regulation of access to land’; and Tom Guthrie, ‘Access 
Rights’ in Robert Rennie (ed.), Property Law Reform: The Promised Land (Edinburgh, 2008), 125–46. 
Act’.94 It then elaborates what that entails, namely the right to be ‘above and below (as well 
as on)’95 land96 for recreational purposes, relevant educational activities (such activities being 
defined as those which further someone’s understanding of natural and cultural heritage)97 
and commercial purposes, provided that the money-making activity can also be undertaken 
‘otherwise than commercially or for profit’.98 Recreation is not defined, but the Access Code 
suggests that this includes activities such as walking, cycling, orienteering, climbing and wild 
camping.99 There is also a stand-alone right to cross land.100  
Section 2(1) acts as a check to section 1, providing that access rights must be 
exercised responsibly. The centrality of responsible access to the operation of the legislative 
scheme is immediately apparent, hence a means of determining what is ‘responsible’ is 
provided. Section 2(2) first sets out: a presumption of responsible access where a person 
exercises access rights without causing ‘unreasonable interference with any of the rights of 
any other person’;101 but notwithstanding that presumption, a person cannot be taken as 
exercising access rights responsibly when acting: i) in contravention of section 9; ii) in 
contravention of any byelaws made under section 12(1)(a)(i);102 or iii) in a manner that 
undermines any work undertaken by the statutory body Scottish Natural Heritage (in 
connection with its role to protect natural heritage). 
Of the three exclusions, section 9 has the greatest practical effect. It contains a 
numerus clausus of seven conduct-based exceptions, such as crossing land in a motorised 
vehicle where that vehicle is not being used to provide mobility for a person with a 
                                                          
94 s.1(1). 
95 s.1(6). Thus, (non-motorised) airborne and speleological pursuits can be as acceptable (if not quite as 
common) as walking. 
96 s.32 defines ‘land’ as including bridges, inland waters, canals and the foreshore. As regards the foreshore, as 
noted above there are overlapping public rights of use and access as part of the Regalia, which are important in 
relation to the foreshore and tidal rivers. The co-existence of these rights with access rights is acknowledged in 
s.5(4). 
97 s.2(5). 
98 s.1(2)(a); s.1(3). The classic example of an outdoor activity that can be undertaken ‘otherwise than 
commercially or for profit’ is hillwalking. Thus, a paid mountain guide can enjoy access rights as much as a 
keen amateur hillwalker. 
99 For a contemporary twist on what might be acceptable recreational access, see Malcolm M. Combe, ‘Gotta 
Catch ‘Em All: Access to Land and #PokemonGo’, University of Aberdeen School of Law Blog, 22 July 2016, 
https://aberdeenunilaw.wordpress.com/2016/07/22/gotta-catch-em-all-but-what-about-the-law-access-to-land-
and-pokemongo/ accessed 4 December 2016. 
100 s.1(2)(b). By the operation of s. 9(g), this is the only right that applies in relation to golf courses. 
101 Rights could be associated with the ownership of land, access rights under the 2003 Act, or any other rights. 
In terms of when access takers should defer to other parties (including other access takers under the 2003 Act), 
see Combe, ‘Get Off That Land: Non-Owner Regulation of Access to Land’, 296. 
102 This has been a particular issue in relation to camping near Loch Lomond, where byelaws have been 
introduced. See http://www.lochlomond-
trossachs.org/images/stories/Visiting/PDF/LochLomondCampByHighRes.pdf accessed 4 December 2016. 
disability,103 any activity that is an offence or breaches a court order,104 or ‘hunting, shooting 
or fishing.’105 In relation to the last of those exceptions, Scotland contrasts with the 
continental legal systems where a landowner cannot exclude someone from land for hunting: 
as explained by Watkin, provided the access taker does no damage or there is no particularly 
sensitive activity going on, this means ‘across continental Europe the somewhat odd principle 
holds that one may only enter upon a neighbour’s land uninvited if one is armed with a 
gun.’106 
If an access taker’s conduct is not caught by section 9, the question of whether that 
conduct is responsible will turn on an analysis of the circumstances of the case at hand. That 
analysis is to have regard to whether an access taker has been following the guidance on 
responsible conduct in the Access Code107 and with reference to four aspects relevant to 
responsibility found in section 2(3) (lawfulness, reasonableness, proper account of the 
interests of others, and the features of the land in question).  
The biggest test for responsible access to date occurred when the owners of a forested 
area in the Highlands traversed by a number of paths, who were on record as being generally 
in favour of public access to their land, decided to close one path to equine access. They did 
this for the (legitimate) reason of preventing damage to the path by the action of multiple 
horses’ hooves. Eventually, the Court of Session agreed that the landowners were able to 
internally zone their land (and steer riders to another path): allowing for a (slight) reassertion 
of the right to exclude.108 
                                                          
103 s.9(f). The prohibition seems clear enough, but it actually leaves some room for dubiety, with one potential 
issue being power-assisted bicycles. Automobiles are clearly excluded, but car parking is mentioned in the 
Access Code notwithstanding (at page 76), under explanation that motorised activities are not covered by access 
rights and, as such, special consideration should be taken when leaving your car anywhere (and see also para. 
3.58). On a landowner’s ability to charge someone for parking on land more generally, this has proven to be a 
problematic area (in Scots contract law terms) until fairly recently. The matter has now been clarified by the UK 
Supreme Court in ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, and see now Vehicle Control Services v Mackie SC 
Dun [2017] SC DUN 24, analysed in Malcolm Combe, ‘Fine to Park Here?’, Journal of the Law Society of 
Scotland, 62(6) (2017), 26–7. It can also be noted that in a recent case that touched on camping and access to 
land, Lord Turnbull was particularly critical of cars being taken onto a site: The Sovereign Indigenous Peoples 
of Scotland (No.2) [2016] CSOH 113, paras 58–59. 
104 s.9(a) and s.9(b). 
105 s.9(c). 
106 He refers to the position in France and Spain, whilst making the observation that non-hunting activities like 
walking, picnicking and rambling would not be permitted. The Scottish position would be the opposite. Thomas 
Glyn Watkin, ‘Stewardship of Land’ in Paul Beaumont (ed.), Christian Perspectives on the Limits of the Law 
(Carlisle, 2002) 118–49, 132. 
107 s.2(2)(b)(i). See also s.2(2)(b)(ii), which provides a further tie-in with the natural and cultural heritage role of 
Scottish Natural Heritage under s.29. 
108 Tuley v The Highland Council 2007 S.L.T. (Sh Ct) 97, rev 2009 S.L.T. 616. Consider also Forbes v Fife 
Council 2009 S.L.T. (Sh Ct) 71. Both these cases are analysed in Malcolm M. Combe, ‘Access to Land and to 
Landownership’, Edinburgh Law Review, 14(1) (2010), 106–13. See also Lovett, ‘Progressive Property in 
Action’, 809–14. 
It can be seen that the manner of purported access is crucial to ensure an access taker 
remains under the auspices of the 2003 Act. Those who engage with a proscribed activity or 
do not meet the required standards of non-interference with the rights of others fall back to 
the traditional Scots law position and can be excluded from the land by an owner.109 The 
place of purported access is also important: access rights are potentially exercisable on all of 
Scotland’s terrain, except for land that is excluded under section 6110 or subject to a 
temporary exclusion that has been sought and obtained by the relevant local authority under 
section 11. 
Section 6 is the more important provision in terms of dictating the geography of 
access, given its automatic and open-ended effect. The language of that section is interesting, 
not least because of its use of the English word ‘exclude’ that chimes with much of the 
English language scholarship. Where it operates, the owner has a right to exclude a purported 
access taker even if she behaves impeccably.  
Within section 6 there are different types of exclusion evident. The exclusion may 
operate automatically, owing to the characteristics of the land, or it may operate from time to 
time, when land is being used for a purpose it has been landscaped for.111 It might also be 
noted an owner’s right to exclude someone from a particular area on a cadastral map might 
reassert itself. For example, access rights may operate one year, but not the next, because 
access rights are no longer compatible with certain features on or of the newly excluded land 
(perhaps through the erection of a building).112 Those permutations aside, if there is clarity 
that land is excluded, access rights cannot be exercised there.  
A recurring point of contention in court has been the extent to which ground around a 
private residence is excluded, under s.6(1)(b)(iv). That provision provides a dwelling should 
have ‘sufficient adjacent land to enable persons living there to have reasonable measures of 
privacy’ and ‘to ensure that their enjoyment of that house or place is not unreasonably 
                                                          
109 As to what non-owners can do in this situation, see Combe, ‘Get off that land: non-owner regulation of 
access to land’. 
110 s.1(7). 
111 Consider s.7(7)(a), which relates to sports pitches or playing fields when they are in use (but compare 
s.7(7)(b) and (c) which are absolute exclusions (relating to sensitive sporting areas like golf greens and synthetic 
surfaces)). Consider also certain (perhaps temporary) uses by the owner which can promote open land to 
excluded land (an active quarry is restricted, a non-active quarry is not: s.6(1)(h)). 
112 On this point, consider Sawers, ‘The Right to Exclude from Unimproved Land’. Tangentially, it seems the 
recent occupation of land near the Scottish Parliament has led to a consideration of suitable sculpting of the 
landscape: The Herald, 11 November 2016 ‘Holyrood bosses to take action to avoid indycamp repeat’, at 
http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/14881040.Holyrood_bosses_to_take_action_to_avoid_indycamp_repeat/ 
(accessed 4 December 2016). On the possibility of a garden being creatively landscaped to engender a need for 
privacy considerations to relate to a wider area of land, see Malcolm M. Combe, ‘No Place Like Home: Access 
Rights over Gardens’, Edinburgh Law Review, 12(3) (2008), 463–8, 467. 
disturbed.’113 It was tested in the ‘tycoon cases’ of Gloag114 and Snowie,115 both of which led 
to a sheriff ruling that certain areas around the expansive residences near Perth and Stirling 
respectively were ‘not land in respect of which access rights are exercisable.’116  
It can be seen that there has been some litigation involving landowners and access 
takers, particularly in relation to land around a dwelling and how much of an area should be 
afforded for privacy and the interaction of access takers with legitimate land management 
activities.117 There have also been occasional issues of competition between access takers.118 
That said, the general indications are that the new access rights are operating in a coherent 
way.119 To those, the simplistic indication that the new legislation has not been profoundly 
revisited since it came into force can be added.120 The issue of access to land did return to the 
Scottish Parliament though, in a somewhat unexpected way. 
 
(b) Access rights come back to the Scottish Parliament 
The most recent court case to feature access rights brings aspects of the foregoing discussion 
together in an illustrative manner.121 It has already been noted that wild camping is treated as 
a recreational activity in the Access Code. It has also been noted above that campaigners 
recently occupied land near the Scottish Parliament. The political activists hoped to remain 
                                                          
113 The provision is supplemented by s.7(5): ‘There are included among the factors which go to determine what 
extent of land is sufficient for the purposes mentioned in s.6(1)(b)(iv) above, the location and other 
characteristics of the house or other place.’ Cf the position in England and Wales, where a fixed distance of 20 
metres from a dwelling is excluded, in terms of the equivalent but less radical Countryside and Rights of Way 
Act 2000. This aspect is discussed by Lovett, ‘Progressive property in action’, 784–5. 
114 Gloag v Perth and Kinross Council 2007 SCLR 530. 
115 Snowie v Stirling Council 2008 S.L.T. (Sh Ct) 61. 
116 s.28. For further discussion, see Combe, ‘No place like home: access rights over “gardens”’. 
117 Tuley v The Highland Council 2007 S.L.T. (Sh Ct) 97, rev 2009 S.L.T. 616. It can be noted that land 
managers must also act responsibly in relation to land where access can be taken, in accordance with section 3 
of the 2003 Act. See further Loch Lomond and Trossachs National Park Authority v Anstalt [2017] SAC (Civ) 
11; 2017 S.L.T. (Sh Ct) 138, discussed in Malcolm M. Combe, ‘Access to land: responsible landowner conduct 
under the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003’, 2017 S.L.T. (News) 201. 
118 Malcolm M. Combe, ‘Get off that land: non-owner regulation of access to land’, Juridical Review, 2014 
287–317. 
119 See the observations in the Final Report of the Land Reform Review Group, The Land of Scotland and the 
Common Good (Edinburgh, 2014), Section 29 ‘Public Access’, available at 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2014/05/2852 (accessed 4 December 2016), and Calum Macleod, Tim 
Braunholtz-Speight, Issie Macphail, Derek Flyn, Sarah Allen and Davie Macleod, ‘Post Legislative Scrutiny of 
the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003’, at 
http://archive.scottish.parliament.uk/s3/committees/rae/documents/Inquiryplanningsheet.pdf (accessed 4 
December 2016). 
120 Part 1 itself came into force on 9 February 2005 (SSI 2005/17). It has been amended slightly (by the Land 
Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 (Modification) Order 2005/65, the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 
(Modification) Order 2013/356), and Part 9 of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016 (asp 18). The fundamentals 
of the scheme are unaffected by these measures. 
121 More detailed analysis is available in Combe, ‘The Indycamp: Demonstrating Access to Land and Access to 
Justice’. 
there until Scotland obtained independence from the rest of the UK. This ‘Indycamp’,122 as it 
came to be known, attracted much press attention in what proved to be an eleven-month stay 
in Edinburgh. Much of that coverage related to the equally colourful court proceedings.123 
One report in The Herald newspaper headlined that ‘Holyrood campers may be permanent 
thanks to law passed by Scottish Parliament’,124 and quoted me in the report. I explained the 
campers could not camp indefinitely right next to a building,125 but if they maintained a safe 
distance and behaved responsibly in line with the Access Code, they might be able to remain 
there, whilst noting there might be civil rights issues to consider as well. 
This argument can colloquially be described as flying a kite. It was by no means 
guaranteed to succeed. In any event the Indycampers did not help themselves by bringing 
motor vehicles and a caravan onto the land, neither of which are allowed in terms of the 2003 
Act. As it transpired, when the matter became litigious the non-professionally represented 
campers did not initially run the argument in court, allowing Lord Turnbull to quickly note 
the following:126 
 
Given that no direct reliance was placed on the 2003 Act, it will be sufficient to note 
that the right of access given by section 1 is a right to be on land for limited purposes, as 
defined within that section, none of which are present in the circumstances of the 
occupation by the Camp. 
 
On appeal, that analysis notwithstanding, the Indycampers decided to develop the 
point after all. It was argued that their activities included recreational elements and also that 
the activities of the camp served an educational purpose. As regards the vehicles and caravan, 
it was submitted that the majority of campers should not be punished because of a minority 
bringing these items to the site, and actually that the legislation prohibited invasion of the 
space around a caravan, and so protected the campers’ occupation. The second strand of that 
                                                          
122 The term ‘Indycamp’ was used by the press: see BBC News, 4 November 2016, ‘IndyCamp group evicted 
from Scottish Parliament site’ http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-37871442, accessed 4 
December 2016. ‘Indy’ has developed into an accepted contraction of ‘independence’ since around the time of 
the Scottish independence referendum on 18 September 2014. 
123 Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body v The Sovereign Indigenous Peoples of Scotland [2016] CSOH 65, 
2016 S.L.T. 761; The Sovereign Indigenous Peoples of Scotland (No.2) [2016] CSOH 113, 2016 S.L.T. 862; 
affirmed [2016] CSIH 81. 
124 The Herald, 5 December 2015 
www.heraldscotland.com/news/14125964.Holyrood_campers_may_be_permanent_thanks_to_law_passed_by_
Scottish_Parliament, accessed 4 December 2016. The headline was not mine. 
125 Buildings, and the curtilages thereof, are excluded from the scope of access rights: s 6(1)(a)(i) and 6(1)(b)(i). 
126 Para. 58, [2016] CSOH 65. 
argument was optimistic.127 For the landowners, a detailed counter-argument explained that 
the primary purpose of the campers was political, and political activities are not inherently 
recreational or educational. Also addressed was the limited duration of the right to be on land: 
‘The Act only allows someone to remain on the premises while the specified purpose is 
carried out. They must then leave.’128 
The Lord Justice Clerk, Lady Dorrian, rejected the argument of the Indycampers, 
simply stating ‘we are satisfied that there is nothing in the Act which justifies the reclaimers’ 
occupation of the property.’129 
With that in mind, it is clear such political campers cannot rely on the 2003 Act in 
future; not only that, the criminal law provisions of the Trespass (Scotland) Act 1865 (which 
regulate occupations, encampments or fires that are not classed as responsible access under 
the 2003 Act) could be deployed against them. There may be other considerations to allow 
such camps (which will be analysed below), but the scope of 2003 Act rights are clearly 
limited in this context.130 The question of what these new access rights mean for the right to 
exclude in light of all of this will now be considered. 
 
(c) Rights of responsible access and the right to exclude 
Lovett has highlighted that the interaction of the underlying Scots law and the 2003 Act 
shows that a legal system which started with a theoretically strong right to exclude can adapt 
to a more porous system, whilst still protecting certain important aspects of the right.131 A 
less considered reform could have flirted with human rights concerns, such as the right to 
private and family life under Article 8 of the ECHR (which is catered for by the exclusion 
around a dwelling),132 and the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions under Article 1 of 
                                                          
127 Whilst the legislation does indeed exclude “a caravan, tent or other place affording a person privacy or 
shelter” and land in the immediate vicinity of such places from the scope of access rights, (under s.6(1)(a)(ii) 
and s.6(1)(b)(iv)), it seems a stretch to imagine that such a restriction can stop a landowner taking enforcement 
action against someone in a place affording privacy or shelter on any other basis. 
128 Para. 26. 
129 Para. 32. 
130 Another limitation, not mentioned so far in this analysis, is that the operation of access rights can be 
temporarily suspended by a local authority acting under s.11, to allow for events such as a music festival or an 
outdoor tournament. Such a suspension would remove any chance to even run an argument about responsible 
access and any purported access takers would not be entitled to take access in that time period. 
131 On this, Lovett’s contribution is particularly valuable: ‘the primary purpose of this Article has been to show 
that it is practically possible for a modern, democratic nation committed to the rule of law, the protection of 
private property, and open markets to create, if it wants, a property regime that to a considerable extent replaces 
the ex ante presumption in favor of the right to exclude that has come to be taken for granted in the United 
States with an equally robust, but rebuttable, ex ante presumption in favor of access.’ Lovett, ‘Progressive 
property in action’, 816–7. 
132 This is considered in the Gloag case and analysed in Carey Miller, ‘Public Access to Private Land in 
Scotland’, 139. 
the First Protocol to the ECHR. Regarding the latter, there is case law that suggests measures 
that require owners to allow private actors to enter their lands on a frequent basis – thereby 
unduly infringing the right to exclude – can be an interference with the right to property.133 
How do the Scottish reforms measure up? 
Access to land is an area of scholarship that has lent itself to much comparative 
study,134 and it is that comparative scholarship that provides two useful insights. First, when 
considering the lesser rights of access contained in the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 
2000 (which opened a comparatively smaller proportion of England and Wales to access and 
did so on narrower terms than Scotland),135 the American commentator Anderson noted these 
(non-compensated) reforms would almost certainly have been struck down by American 
courts as an unconstitutional taking.136 A fortiori, the stronger Scots reforms would have been 
similarly struck down.137 That is of academic interest: how does contemporary Scots law fare 
against the human rights regime that actually applies to it? A scholarly dialogue between two 
South Africans provides an answer (again in the context of a comparison of English and 
Scots law), where Carey Miller noted the following:138 
 
case law has come to recognise that the detail of a controlling requirement of balancing 
is appropriately dealt with in the statute. The Scottish access legislation does this and, to 
                                                          
133 In one case, a requirement to allow the public to use roads privately owned by individuals ‘significantly 
reduced in practice effective exercise of their ownership’: Bugajny v Poland App no 22531/05 ECtHR 6 
November 2007, para. 59. Consider also Chassagnou and others v France (2000) 29 EHRR 615 and Herrmann v 
Germany (2013) 56 EHRR 7, the former being an imposition of forced collectivisation of hunting rights that did 
fall foul of the human rights law, the latter being a  similar situation where the correct balance was struck. 
134 The writing of Anderson, Lovett, Carey Miller and Combe has already been referred to. For two legal 
systems not yet mentioned, see Richard Campion and Janet Stephenson, ‘The “right to roam”: Lessons for New 
Zealand from Sweden's allemansrätt’, Journal of Policy Research in Tourism, Leisure and Events, 6(1) (2014), 
52–65. 
135 In England and Wales, the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 applies to mapped open access land, 
which includes mountains, moor, heath and down, and registered commons (making a much smaller proportion 
of the country available for access when contrasted with Scotland, in the region of 865,000 acres). That 
legislation confers the right to enter and remain on land for the purposes of open-air recreation, but that right is 
restricted by twenty exceptions listed in a schedule to the statute, the overall effect of which would allow 
someone to walk on land, accompanied by a dog (but no other animal) and stop for a picnic, but not use a metal 
detector, camp or bathe in non-tidal water (making for a more limited range of activities than Scotland). There is 
also access to coastal areas by virtue of the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009. 
136 Anderson, ‘Britain’s Right to Roam: Redefining the Landowner’s Bundle of Sticks’, 426. In terms of how 
much monetary effect the English reforms had, see Klick and Parchomovsky, ‘The Value of the Right to 
Exclude: An Empirical Assessment’. No equivalent Scottish analysis exists. 
137 Cf Lovett, ‘Progressive Property in Action’, 815–6 who briefly notes (with prospective reference to Sawers’ 
article that was later published in the Temple Law Review), there might be a way it ‘could survive a 
constitutional attack because it would “create an average reciprocity of advantage”’, before noting ‘this is not 
the place to work out these constitutional subtleties.’ This is not the place either, but see now Sawers, ‘The 
Right to Exclude from Unimproved Land’, 670. 
138 Carey Miller, ‘Public Access to Private Land in Scotland’, 138. 
this extent, is probably proof against constitutional challenge. It is submitted that the 
comments of Professor André van der Walt relating to the English access provision 
apply equally to the Scottish legislation. 
 
Finally, another aspect in the general acceptance of the rights of responsible access 
flows from the particular history and culture in Scotland, which has been analysed at length 
by Alexander.139 This has been coupled with, or indeed manifested by, a general tradition of 
tolerance of access to mountains (over and above any difficulties of enforcement for a 
landowner against a one-time bare trespasser). 
From this, it is clear that Part 1 of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003 provides a 
working model for rights of public access to private land, in a way that reconceptualises the 
right to exclude rather than makes it redundant. That being the case, any observers who think 
it might be a successful export to another jurisdiction should have careful regard to any 
historic, cultural or human rights considerations to ensure such a scheme would be properly 
received. 
 
(d) Access to land without a property foundation 
The above discussion explains the strong position a landowner is in when there is no 
underlying right of access or permission. Does this mean that a landowner can remove 
anyone taking access in other circumstances? To phrase it as it was put in the ECHR case of 
Appleby, is the ability to eject ‘generally unfettered’, with no test for reasonableness?140 
                                                          
139 Gregory S. Alexander, ‘The Sporting Life: Democratic Culture and the Historical Origins of the Scottish 
Right to Roam’, University of Illinois Law Review, (2016) 321–70. On the importance of history and ‘a society’s 
collective historical consciousness’ to the acceptance of such reforms, see also Lovett, ‘Progressive property in 
action’, 817. A keen sense of history, particularly in the Highlands and Islands of Scotland, means the Highland 
Clearances cast a long shadow: consider James Hunter, A Millennial History of the Highlands and Islands of 
Scotland (Edinburgh, 2000) and his more recent and geographically targeted Set Adrift Upon the World: The 
Sutherland Clearances (Edinburgh, 2015), and see also Michael Fry, Wild Scots: Four Hundred Years of 
Highland History (London, 2005). (The significance of Fry’s text will be returned to below.) On the popularity 
of mountaineering even in the absence of any formal right to do so, see Carey Miller, ‘Public Access to Private 
Land in Scotland’, 121–2, the preface by George Menzies (the then Chairman of the Scottish Rights of Way and 
Access Society) in Paisley, Access Rights and Rights of Way, 5–6, and the comments in Carey Miller and 
Combe, ‘The Boundaries of Property Rights in Scots Law’, 22. 
140 Appleby v United Kingdom (2003) 37 EHRR 38 para 22, Consider also Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins 
447 U.S. 74 (1980), discussed in David L. Callies and J. David Breemer, ‘The Right to Exclude Others From 
Private Property: A Fundamental Constitutional Right’. In the one partly dissenting opinion in Appleby, Judge 
Maruste noted, ‘The old traditional rule that the private owner has an unfettered right to eject people from his 
land and premises without giving any justification and without any test of reasonableness being applied is no 
longer fully adapted to contemporary conditions and society.’ This chimes with the contributions of van der 
Walt, discussed below. See also Kevin Gray and Susan Francis Gray, ‘Civil Rights, Civil Wrongs and Quasi-
Public Space’, European Human Rights Law Review, 4(1) (1999), 46–102. 
The recent decision about the Indycamp confirms that vacant possession can be 
recovered although there are other considerations that come into play when there is a public-
sector landowner.141 The analysis of van der Walt is helpful here, who positioned such other 
considerations under a heading that pitted property against ‘privileged statutory non-property 
rights’.142 For the Indycamp case, those rights are found in Article 10 (Freedom of 
expression) and Article 11 (Freedom of assembly and association) of the ECHR. In the first 
of his two opinions, Lord Turnbull noted that he had to consider ‘whether the interference 
with the [Indycampers’] rights entailed in granting an order [for possession] would be lawful, 
necessary and proportionate.’143 He asked to hear evidence of whether and how the 
Indycampers constituted an interference with the rights of others to access the grounds of the 
Scottish Parliament, which he then weighed in a proportionality assessment in which he 
decided that the landowner’s steps were proportionate.144 He observed that, ‘In essence the 
[indycampers’] position seems to be that their rights under articles 10 and 11 should trump 
both the petitioner’s right to possession and the rights of others to enjoy undisturbed use of 
the grounds’, then noted that this approach was ‘selfish or even arrogant’, illustrating that 
with their approach to hosting barbecues and parking motor vehicles on the (grass) land 
despite nearby parking provision,145 and noting that the recovery of possession sought did not 
impair the ability to protest at the grounds of the Scottish Parliament and any interference 
with the Indycampers’ article 10 and 11 rights would be targeted, limited and not deprive 
them of the essence of their rights.146 
The Inner House of the Court of Session adhered to this analysis. That result 
notwithstanding, the saga shows that other factors can and do weigh against the right to 
exclude. In South Africa, this has occurred in relation to burial rights147 and labour rights.148 
Van der Walt also highlights a pertinent German case, at Frankfurt Airport,149 before going 
                                                          
141 This is an abridged version of the analysis in Combe, ‘The Indycamp: Demonstrating Access to Land and 
Access to Justice’. 
142 van der Walt, ‘The Modest Systemic Status of Property Rights’, 3.4. 
143 Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body v The Sovereign Indigenous Peoples of Scotland [2016] CSOH 65, 
2016 S.L.T. 761, para. 64. 
144 The Sovereign Indigenous Peoples of Scotland (No.2) [2016] CSOH 113, 2016 S.L.T. 862, paras 49–57. 
145 Ibid., para. 58. 
146 Ibid., paras 63–64. 
147 On burial rights and indeed other rights, consider Carey Miller, ‘The Great Trek to Human Rights:’ 
particularly 212–3. 
148 van der Walt, ‘The Modest Systemic Status of Property Rights’, 71–8. 
149 1 BvR 699/06 – 78–84. In discussing that case, van der Walt observes: ‘When property rights clash with 
civic, political or social rights that are protected by dedicated legislation, it seems, protecting property rights will 
tend, at least in some instances, to be a modest systemic objective to the extent that the protection of property 
rights is restricted to the space that remains once the non-property right identified and regulated in the dedicated 
legislation had been secured. In instances where the presumptive power does not shift so clearly or inevitably to 
on to consider matters which might even fall short of a privileged right. He does this with 
reference to a South African case where – in sharp contrast to Appleby – an attempt to 
completely deny access to premises was unsuccessful, owing to matters like the area’s 
importance to the community and the need for free movement.150  
Access rights can be classed as one such limitation, as can the considerations 
discussed here that might not feature in a traditional property law analysis. This is as it should 
be, in a dynamic system of law that seeks to adapt to modern circumstances. The final matter 
covered in this section might be seen as another move away from traditional land law. In 
actual fact it reflects a wider shift towards land reform in the treatment of private property. 
 
3. Modern considerations for exclusion from land  
 
In his study of the English right to roam, Anderson notes the following:  
 
The example teaches us that the composition of the bundle is not necessarily immutable, 
and that changes may be desirable to better reflect contemporary society's needs and 
values. Of course, the relative stability of property rights is extremely valuable, because 
it honors settled expectations and therefore promotes economic transactions and furthers 
our desire for fairness. But property rights must evolve and the right to roam reminds us 
that, in the end, the recognition of the private owners' rights involves a trade-off with 
public interests that should not be ignored.151  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the non-property right, protecting property rights might still be a modest systemic objective to the extent that 
non-property rights are allowed to impose reasonably easily justifiable limitations on property owners’ right to 
exclude non-owners.’ 
150 This is dealt with under the heading ‘Other Free Speech and Demonstration Cases’, the case in question 
being the one referred to be Carey Miller in: Victoria & Alfred Waterfront (Pty) Ltd v Police  Commissioner of 
the Western Cape. In a similar vein, Dhliwayo introduces her PhD thesis (which was supervised by van der 
Walt) by noting ‘that limitations on the right to exclude are normal in a legal and constitutional system within 
which property functions and of which limitations are part. Case law and examples dealing with the conflict 
between exclusion and access rights indicate that exclusion of non-owners is not always the preferred outcome 
and that it is not prioritised abstractly. This suggests that the right to exclude is relative and contextual in 
nature.’ Priviledge Dhliwayo, ‘A constitutional analysis of access rights that limit landowners’ right to exclude’ 
(Ph.D. thesis, Stellenbosch University, 2015) available at http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/97933, accessed 4 
December 2016. 
151 Anderson, ‘Britain's Right to Roam: Redefining the Landowner's Bundle of Sticks’, 430. 
That property rights must evolve is a valid point. The enforcement powers that allow 
entry to be taken to remove high hedges or noise-making equipment have already been 
referred to. All of these evolutions challenge the right to exclude.152  
Another relevant situation, where an entirely different type of relationship fails to 
function as both parties envisaged, is that of a lease when the tenant holds over at the end of 
the term and stays in possession (with or without the continued offer of rent). Alternatively, a 
tenant may simply stop paying rent. Landlords can be expected to wish to recover possession 
in such circumstances, but (particularly with regard to residential tenancies) there are rules to 
prevent that happening summarily153 and, in South Africa, in a way that overly prejudices the 
tenant.154 Again, the right to exclude is regulated. 
That South African measure can be placed within a much wider movement for land 
reform in that country.155 Scotland might not have an exact equivalent to the Prevention of 
Illegal Eviction and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998.156 Nevertheless, Scotland 
has taken a number of steps of its own in relation to land reform.157 It was noted in 2004 that 
a comparison of the policy-oriented land law reform measures in the two jurisdictions 
demonstrated ‘difference and not similarity’.158 Whilst that remains largely true,159 the 
                                                          
152 High Hedges (Scotland) Act 2013 (asp 6); Antisocial Behaviour etc. (Scotland) Act 2004 (asp 8), s 47. 
Consider also The Matrimonial Homes (Family Protection) (Scotland) Act 1981, although as noted previously 
that hyper-specific aspect of family law will not be analysed here. 
153 In the Rent (Scotland) Act 1984.  
154 See Anne Pope, ‘A Tricky Balancing Act: reflections on recent South African eviction jurisprudence’ (in this 
volume). 
155 See H. Mostert, ‘Land as a “national asset” under the Constitution: the system change envisaged by the 2011 
Green Paper on land policy and what this means for property law under the Constitution’, Potchefstroom 
Electronic Law Journal, 17(2) (2014), 760–96 at http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/pelj.v17i2.06 (accessed 4 December 
2016); J. M. Pienaar, Land Reform (Cape Town, 2014); D. L. Carey Miller with Anne Pope, Land Title in South 
Africa (Cape Town, 2000), particularly chapters 6 and 10; D. L. Carey Miller, ‘A New Property’, South African 
Law Journal, 116(4) (1999), 749–59; Carey Miller, ‘The Great Trek to Human Rights’, particularly 209–16; and 
Alexander, The Global Debate over Constitutional Property, chapter four, entitled ‘From Social Obligation to 
Social Transformation? South Africa’s Experience with Constitutional Property’. 
156 At least, not in terms of private residential leasing. There is specific legislation to deal with the problem of 
homelessness, which places an obligation on local authorities. A slight analogy might also be made about the 
rules which prevent instant enforcement of securities over residential premises in the Conveyancing and Feudal 
Reform (Scotland) Act 1970 (following its amendment by the Home Owner and Debtor Protection (Scotland) 
Act 2010 (asp 6)), which requires a sheriff to consider matters like alternative housing provision before allowing 
enforcement by a secured creditor. For the purposes of this discussion the analogy is inexact, as a secured 
creditor is not technically the owner, so any regulation of enforcement is not actually a restriction on the 
proprietor’s right to exclude. 
157 See Malcolm M. Combe, ‘The Environmental Implications of Redistributive Land Reform’, Environmental 
Law Review, 18(2) (2016), 104–25 and Combe, ‘The Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016: Another Answer to the 
Scottish Land Question’. 
158 Kenneth Reid and C. G. van der Merwe, ‘Property Law: Some Themes and Variations’ in Reinhard 
Zimmerman, Daniel Visser and Kenneth Reid (eds), Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property 
and Obligations in Scotland and South Africa (Oxford 2004), 637–71, 670. 
159 Consider, for example, Richard Cramer and Hanri Mostert, ‘“Home” and Unlawful Occupation: The Horns 
of Local Government’s Dilemma: Fischer and Another v Persons Unknown 2014 3 SA 291 (WCC)’ 
passage of the Community Empowerment (Scotland) Act 2015 (asp 6) and the Land Reform 
(Scotland) Act 2016 (asp 18) demonstrates that Scotland is continuing on something of a land 
reform journey.160 At first glance, neither of these measures seem a direct challenge to a 
landowner’s right to exclude. On further consideration the new community right to buy land 
that has been wholly or mainly neglected or abandoned land is in point. This right, when the 
new Part 3A of the 2003 Act is brought into force, will allow properly constituted community 
bodies to force the sale of land to them. The relevance to the right to exclude may seem 
contrived, but it comes into focus when it becomes clear that a landowner will no longer be 
able to simply exclude others from her land and do nothing else with impunity.161 That is to 
say, for the landowner to avoid a potential taking event (albeit with compensation), some 
kind of activity that shows the land is being used will be required.162 In a contorted way, the 
right to exclude is no longer the sine qua non, because the right to continue as owner without 
challenge only exists if the landowner is also doing something productive and not resting on 
her exclusionary laurels.163 Whilst this is not a direct erosion of proprietor’s right to exclude, 
it means that any proprietor who simply excludes others from land and does nothing else can 
be faced with a land reform reallocation. Meanwhile, another strand of the Scottish land 
reform programme encourages landowners to engage with communities whenever they make 
decisions about land that will affect them: this means a landowner who is moved to act to 
avoid a potential buyout should then consider the interests of a local community when it 
comes to any given action.164 
All of this might be seen as a more general trend towards social usage of land. 
Scotland and South Africa are taking steps towards using land for the common good or as a 
national asset under an overt land reform banner, but moves towards more social usage of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Stellenbosch Law Review, 26(3) (2015), 583–611, on the difficult situation authorities in South Africa find 
themselves in when trying to combat the issues of homelessness and illegal land occupation, which is not 
exactly mirrored in contemporary Scotland. (Although Scotland has had some experience of similar unlawful 
occupation as recently as the previous century: see, for example, Ben Buxton, The Vatersay Raiders (Edinburgh, 
2008).) 
160 And it is still not over, both in terms of implementing those statutes and also in terms of the measures which 
were proposed in the Final Report of the Land Reform Review Group, The Land of Scotland and the Common 
Good, which have not yet found their way into legislation but might yet do so. 
161 Consider Hanri Mostert, ‘No right to neglect? Exploratory observations on how policy choices challenge 
basic principles of property’ in Susan Scott and Jeannie van Wyk, Property Law Under Scrutiny (Claremont, 
2015), 11–30. 
162 This could lead to some interesting questions in the future, perhaps where a landowner has made a conscious 
decision to do nothing with land for conservation or re-wilding purposes. 
163 It should be acknowledged that there is a certain crossover between the point made about prescription above, 
which represents a situation where an owner has had a chance to exclude another but has not done so, and the 
situation under discussion. Both might be thought of as not automatically susceptible to analysis in terms of the 
right to exclude. 
164 Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016, Part 4. 
land do not need to be branded as such. For example, Pascoe notes that England and Wales is 
moving to a situation of property relativism which ‘signifies that the landowner is not entitled 
to exploit165 land resources irrespective of community need and represents a more outward-
looking orientation,’ citing the fiscal treatment of empty property, rules about hunting, and 
access to land in her analysis.166 To a greater or lesser extent, those three examples also relate 
to the right to exclude (the first example by using taxation to incentivise use, which again 
penalises an owner who excludes and does nothing else, and the latter examples more 
directly).  
There is much for proponents of a strong right to exclude to think about when 
considering land, and Scotland, especially in light of contemporary conceptualisations of land 
as having some kind of role for the common good.167 Scotland has witnessed both a direct 
and an indirect erosion of a landowner’s entitlement to decide who to exclude from land. As a 
result, more people have a say in matters relating to land in a way that remains sensitive to 
the landowner.  
The final part of this chapter will now step away from land. It will consider a field of 
property law where a move towards more social usage has not been so readily apparent, 
namely corporeal moveable property. 
 
Conceptions of the right to exclude – corporeal moveables in Scots law168 
The standard Scottish definition of ownership – that of the institutional writer Erskine – has 
already been alluded to.169 According to Erskine, ownership may be either limited by law or 
agreement. This applies to both moveable and immoveable property. Meanwhile, Bell offers 
                                                          
165 Or not exploit, as the case may be. 
166 Pascoe, ‘Social obligation norm and the erosion of land ownership?’, 496. On empty property, consider the 
‘Fill ‘Em Up’ campaign of The Big Issue magazine (a publication which aims to tackle homelessness in the 
UK): ‘How to Rescue an Empty House’, The Big Issue 23–29 November 2015, 1068, 18–9. That report 
included details of the UK Government’s Empty Homes Programme, which has since closed. There are also 
options available at a municipal level, with local authorities having the ability to remove any empty property 
discount or set a council tax increase in relation to long term unoccupied homes (but not second homes): see 
http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Government/local-government/17999/counciltax/Secondhomes (accessed 4 
December 2016). 
167 The next step in this direction for Scotland will be the new land rights and responsibilities statement, 
provided for by the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2016, s.1. 
168 This analysis draws on the content of D. L. Carey Miller, M. M. Combe, A. J. M. Steven and S. Wortley, 
‘National Report on the Transfer of Movables in Scotland’ in W. Faber and B. Lurger (eds), National Reports 
on the Transfer of Movables in Europe Volume 2: England and Wales, Ireland, Scotland, Cyprus (Munich, 
2009), 297, particularly 1.2. 
169 Erskine, Institute, II.1.1: ‘the right of using and disposing of a subject as our own, except in so far as we are 
restrained by law or paction’. 
a definition of ownership specifically in relation to moveables, emphasising exclusivity but 
also stressing the restrictions that can apply, as follows:170 
 
Ownership in moveables is a right of exclusive and absolute use and enjoyment, with 
uncontrollable powers of disposal, provided no use be made of the subject and no 
alienation attempted, which for purposes of public policy, convenience, or justice, are, 
by the general disposition of the common law or by special enactments of the 
Legislature, forbidden; or from which, by obligation or contract, the owner has bound 
himself to abstain.  
 
What does this mean in terms of the rights of the owner of a corporeal moveable? 
Writing in that context, Professor Gordon commented that ‘It is not profitable to attempt to 
enumerate the rights of an owner – it is simpler to say that he has any right to deal with 
property of which he is not deprived by law or by his own contract’.171 This is a valid point 
(although it jars somewhat against Honoré’s claim that it is not worthless to seek to delineate 
aspects of ownership),172 but it is clear that the right to recover a moveable from a third party 
is a key manifestation of ownership173 and in turn the right to exclude.174 
To put it another way, and to borrow the words of Carey Miller (writing in 1986), ‘the 
right to vindicate [is] synonymous with ownership.’175 That work – which specifically 
focusses on ownership rather than the incidents of it, draws on Grotius, with Carey Miller 
characterising his treatment thus: ‘the right to recover lost possession is the quintessence of 
ownership’.176 Putting this in a Scots context, Carey Miller (writing in 2005) explains,177 ‘An 
                                                          
170 Bell, Principles § 1284 
171 Gordon, in Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland, para. 533. 
172 Honoré, ‘Ownership’, 111. 
173 This is, in turn, linked to the fact that ownership gives a right to exclusive possession. In the (less common) 
situations of a dispute between non-owner parties where the right of ownership is not at play, those with another 
right (such as possession or detention) can similarly recover and exclude: see Malcolm M. Combe, ‘Communist 
ideas and Scots property law: Canning v Glasgow Caledonian University’, Scots Law Times (News), 2016, 34–6 
(with the case commented on reported at 2016 S.L.T. (Sh Ct) 56) and Craig Anderson, ‘Recovery of goods by a 
non-owner’, Scots Law Times (News), 2016, 22, 117–21. See generally Craig Anderson, Possession of 
Corporeal Moveables (Edinburgh, 2015), Carey Miller, Corporeal Moveables, 10.24–10.31 (on the wrong and 
remedy of spuilzie) and John Townsend, ‘Raising Lazarus: Why Spuilzie Should Be Resurrected’ Aberdeen 
Student Law Review, 2 (2011), 22–51. 
174 It is acknowledged that the right to use the property, which for many moveables will instantly imply an 
exclusivity, although it is also acknowledged that there is an element of conflation between exclusion and use 
here. This seems unavoidable: consider the references to Rahmatian, Lord Kames: Legal and Social Theorist 
and Penner, The Idea of Property. See also Merrill, ‘The Right to Exclude: II’, 4–5. 
175 Carey Miller, Acquisition and Protection of Ownership, 11.1.1 
176 Carey Miller, Acquisition and Protection of Ownership, 11.1.1. 
177 Carey Miller, Corporeal Moveables, 1.19. 
owner who can show that he lost possession involuntarily can,178 in principle, recover the 
thing from even an innocent onerous possessor.’179 Statute might regulate recovery of 
possession in idiosyncratic situations: for example, the Consumer Credit Act 1974, section 
90, regulates the recovery of possession of certain goods where a debtor is in breach of a hire-
purchase or regulated conditional sale agreement relating to those goods but has paid more 
than a third of the price. That section is not mentioned by Carey Miller, but it is perhaps 
situations like that which led his more recent (2005) treatment to move away from the 
recovery of possession aspect as key to ownership when he expressed: 
 
Although in theory ownership is an absolute right, in practice it is often constrained and 
controlled to the point that hardly more than a collection of residual rights remain: one 
accordingly tends to think of the apposite criterion of ownership as an intact right of 
disposal.180 
 
That observation seems to fillet any attempt to characterise the right to exclude as the 
key consideration for corporeal moveable property. Is Carey Miller (writing in 2005) correct 
that the apposite criterion is an intact right of disposal? It is submitted that Carey Miller 
(writing in 1986) also made an important point that remains valid. Furthermore, an intact 
right of disposal for a thing that is so constrained and controlled as to prevent recovery could 
legitimately be described as (economically) worthless. Whilst the right to exclude is perhaps 
not as crucial in relation to moveable property scholarship as it seems to be for land, it does 
still have a role. That being said, an entitlement to exclude others from using a corporeal 
moveable can be regulated when society deems it necessary (much like it could be with land), 
as can be seen in relation to goods bought on credit by consumers and other examples relating 
to potentially harmful items. 
 
Conclusion 
Carey Miller’s observation that an intact right of disposal is the apposite criterion of 
ownership for a corporeal moveable contributes to a wider discussion which shows that the 
                                                          
178 Here, Carey Miller refers to Stair, Institutions, III.2.7. In Scots law there is a presumption of ownership that 
flows from being in possession, but this can be rebutted where the owner can show possession was lost in a 
manner that was inconsistent with a transfer of ownership. 
179 Carey Miller, Corporeal Moveables, para 1.12. 
180 Carey Miller, Corporeal Moveables, para 1.12, with reference to Stair, Institutions, II.I.pr. Similar wording 
to this extract appears in MacQueen and Eassie (eds), Gloag and Henderson, at 30.01, although it is explained 
in a footnote (9) that Bell ‘links exclusivity with the power of disposal’. 
role of exclusion theory should not be overstated in a modern system of property law. A more 
fundamental point about the right to exclude has been added by van der Walt, who notes that 
an analysis founded on ‘the modest systemic status of property rights in a particular context’ 
is appropriate.181 Both points are valid but, standing those critiques, it is clear that exclusion 
is a huge part of property law analysis in Scotland and beyond. 
In a Scottish context, this is all too evident in the remarks of Lord Turnbull in the 
recent case about the Indycamp at the Scottish Parliament. In an eminently quotable passage, 
he stated ‘the general law of land ownership in Scotland entitles the petitioner to have 
exclusive use of its property, to resist encroachment upon it and to otherwise regulate the use 
of its property.’182 But the remainder of his careful judicial consideration, not to mention the 
points covered in the unsuccessful appeal against that, shows the situation is more nuanced 
than that attractively simple proposition (the Inner House’s approval of Lord Turnbull’s 
reasoning notwithstanding). 
Some would point out that the right to exclude has never been absolute anyway.183 
Others might take up Carey Miller’s point that disposal is the apposite criterion of ownership, 
or offer alternative critiques to the primacy of the right to exclude.184 Others still would argue 
now is the time to be moving away from traditional ideas of ownership that focus on aspects 
like exclusion.185 Be that as it may, this analysis provides an original counterpoint to the 
continuing narrative about the exclusionary influence that has threaded through Scots 
property law analyses, particularly with regard to the ongoing reform of land law in Scotland. 
This will prove useful to those trying to explain what exactly ownership is or does. 
                                                          
181 He notes the following: ‘instead of just emphasising limitations or exceptions that restrict the owner’s right to 
exclude, I also argue that progressive property theory should focus on the systemically modest role that property 
rights play, and should play, in the broader systemic context of at least certain legal disputes. Analysing 
property disputes from the perspective of the modest systemic status of property rights in a particular context 
supports the progressive property approach even when the discussion starts out from limitations on or 
exceptions to the right of exclusion, since the limitations and exceptions are not presented as counterpoint rules 
but as examples of a broader principle regarding the systemic status of property rights.’ van der Walt, ‘The 
Modest Systemic Status of Property Rights’, 30–1. 
182 Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body v The Sovereign Indigenous Peoples of Scotland [2016] CSOH 65, 
2016 S.L.T. 761, para. 35. 
183 Alexander, ‘The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law’, 801; Gretton and Steven, Property, 
Trusts and Succession, 3.3. 
184 Freyfogle, On Private Property, 57-60, where he highlights the related but nonetheless distinct right to halt 
interferences in place of a bald right to exclude. It is noteworthy that this non-interference conceptualisation 
resonates with the test for responsible access in the 2003 Act. 
185 See P.J. Badenhorst, Juanita M. Pienaar and Hanri Mostert, Silberberg and Schoeman's The Law of Property 
5th edition (Durban, 2006), 93. There, after listing the usual entitlements associated with property, they note ‘it 
is obvious that changing social, economic and political conditions cannot justify a concept of ownership 
unchanged in content and function since Roman and Roman-Dutch times.’ See also the detailed discussion in 
Gray and Gray, ‘Civil Rights, Civil Wrongs and Quasi-Public Space’. 
Concurrently, it demonstrates that a recognisable system of property law can subsist despite 
an active programme of land reform and a certain amount of exclusion erosion. 
That concludes the targeted analysis in this paper. I pray your indulgence for some 
closing observations about David Carey Miller. First, a passing comment on his legal 
analysis, and how it troubled me. Not in a negative way, I should stress. Rather, I confess that 
his above quoted observation about disposal being the nub of ownership (in the context of 
corporeal moveables) presented me with a challenge when trying to conclude this chapter 
which I had formed around exclusion. This was not his first challenge to me. I can recall 
various discussions where I confidently offered my analysis, to which he often nonchalantly 
(but never arrogantly) offered his somewhat more developed thoughts, which forced me to 
reconsider matters. It seemed fitting to give him something of a final word here. 
Finally, some personal insights, which I hope offer more insight into him as a man.186 
On 20 August 2013 the summer diet of exams at the University of Aberdeen was underway. 
Some students were tackling the Law of Property paper that David, other colleagues, and I 
had set. With apologies to those students,  any exam travails faced are not important to this 
anecdote. The more noteworthy travails were mine. To put it mildly, I was not at my best that 
day. I was finding the simple task of exam invigilation to be a struggle: for context, I was no 
longer able to walk the relatively short distance from my home to the university, my 
breathlessness and groin strain being attributed to a recently diagnosed hernia. David had 
kindly volunteered to help with invigilation that day, but the main thing he witnessed – with 
some concern – was me hirpling around the exam hall. He accompanied me back to the 
School of Law after the exam, carrying more than his fair share of exam scripts on my behalf. 
Clearly something was wrong with me, and the next day I was admitted to Aberdeen Royal 
Infirmary after blood tests showed a concern that was decidedly not a hernia. The next again 
day I was diagnosed with stage 4 testicular cancer: this went some way to explaining my 
breathlessness and other travails. 
It goes without saying this was not a great time for me, but I was lucky enough to 
have colleagues who launched into action to help. Special mention must go to the Law of 
Property team of Roddy Paisley, Andrew Simpson, Douglas Bain and Abbe Brown, but extra 
special mention goes to David. Not only did he step up to replace me as class coordinator of 
that course for the impending term, he also furnished me with copious supplies of books, 
                                                          
186 This insight, and others, have been incorporated into a blog post: Malcolm M. Combe, ‘David Carey Miller: 
A Tribute’, University of Aberdeen School of Law Blog, 29 February 2016, 
https://aberdeenunilaw.wordpress.com/2016/02/29/david-carey-miller-a-tribute/ accessed 4 December 2016. 
butteries and best wishes when he visited me in the hospital at the first possible opportunity. 
(Fry’s book on the Highlands, which I refer to above, was one such book.) He was then 
considerate enough to keep me involved where appropriate. When I was well enough to 
participate in academic tasks, he let me do so. When I was not, I was able to rely on him to 
coordinate a course in my absence. 
Fast forward to February 2016 and I offer one further anecdote. My last 
communication with David was an email attaching a case commentary note.187 The draft note 
related to a dispute about corporeal moveable property. He sent me some helpful points for 
consideration. I replied to thank him, offered him some counter-analysis, and also noted that I 
was actually on annual leave that day (albeit I was replying to emails). David then sent me 
some further thoughts and source material, whilst simultaneously imploring that I did not 
reply to his correspondence on my day off. I followed his order. I am strangely gutted that I 
did. I did not get to finish that last conversation with him, as his sudden death intervened. 
That being said, even that abrupt ending to that correspondence, at his behest, tells something 
of the man: not only was he keen to help in that specific instance, he was also looking out for 
my best interests as a whole. 
I have already dedicated that case note to David. I am happy to be able to add this 
chapter to this collection in his memory. 
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